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ABSTRACT—Self-enhancement denotes a class of psycho-
logical phenomena that involve taking a tendentiously
positive view of oneself. We distinguish between four levels
of self-enhancement—an observed effect, an ongoing
process, a personality trait, and an underlying motive—
and then use these distinctions to organize the wealth of
relevant research. Furthermore, to render these distinc-
tions intuitive, we draw an extended analogy between self-
enhancement and the phenomenon of eating. Among the
topics we address are (a) manifestations of self-enhance-
ment, both obvious and subtle, and rival interpretations;
(b) experimentally documented dynamics of affirming and
threatening the ego; and (c) primacy of self-enhancement,
considered alongside other intrapsychic phenomena, and
across different cultures. Self-enhancement, like eating, is
a fundamental part of human nature.
Many thinkers have remarked that human beings hold an ex-
cessively flattering view of themselves and of things associated
with the self. The intellectual foundation for this viewpoint was
laid by the Cyrenaics (Tatarkiewicz, 1976), the Epicureans (De
Witt, 1973), and the Sophists (Skoyles, 1998), and it was
strengthened by Renaissance philosophers (Macfarlane, 1978).
Hobbes (1651/1991), in his portrait of man as a self-interested
beast, affirmed that ‘‘Men [are] vehemently in love with their own
new opinions’’ (p. 48). Mandeville (1705) believed that humans
place a high premium on themselves and expect others to view
them in the same manner. This thinking is echoed in Leibnizian
optimism (1710/1985) and in the utilitarian tradition of Ben-
tham (1785/1982) and John Stuart Mill (1863/2004).
More pointedly, both Schopenhauer (1844/1966) and Freud
(1905/1961) maintained that people, eager to regard themselves
as civilized and reasonable, repress the unsettling knowledge
that sexual urges prompt much of their behavior. Earlier, La
Rochefoucauld (1678/1827), in his celebrated volume of aph-
orisms, repeatedly emphasized how amour-propre prompted
people to deceive both others and themselves. Even Nietzsche
(1886/1972), that eloquent apologist for self-aggrandizement,
warned that pride had the power to rewrite memory (Maxim 68,
p. 72).
Ultimately, it fell to William James (1890/1950) to system-
atize such assorted observations and to posit a principle to unify
them. In Chapter 10 of hisPrinciples of Psychology, he noted that
the ‘‘central part of the Self is felt’’ (p. 298) and that ‘‘self-com-
placency and self-dissatisfaction’’ (p. 305) are the primary
emotions aroused by contemplating the constituents of selfhood.
Furthermore, people’s urgent concern with achieving tangible
success and earning public acclaim (‘‘social self-seeking’’)
suggested to James that ‘‘each of us is animated by a direct
feeling of regard for his [self] ’’ (p. 308). James then defined this
self as an object of consciousness—an empirical ‘‘me’’ com-
prised of ego-relevant interests, and not merely a metaphysical
‘‘I’’ providing some abstract principle of identity.
Over a century later, this empirical ‘‘me’’ has become a topic
of extensive scientific research and theory, much of it pertaining
to the key animating principle first identified by James: self-
enhancement (Baumeister, 1998; J.D. Brown, 1998; Sedikides &
Gregg, 2003). Surprisingly, however, much recent philosophy of
mind—despite delving in detail into the criteria for personal
identity (Gallagher & Shear, 1999; Parfit, 1984) and into the
paradoxes of self-deception (Elster, 1986; Mele, 2001)—has
had comparatively little to say about why the self, for all its
notorious elusiveness, demands to be so positively evaluated
(but see Kurzban & Aktipis, 2007, for one recent attempt).
A GASTRONOMIC ANALOGY
Roughly speaking, self-enhancement involves taking a ten-
dentiously favorable view of oneself. In what follows, we will try
to further clarify the concept by drawing an extended (and
perhaps far-fetched) analogy between it and a more familiar
concept: eating. We do this because the term self-enhancement
can refer to several phenomena that stand in need of careful
distinction. Eating is a motivated activity in humans; one rooted
in biology but regulated by culture. Precisely because
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eating manifests itself in various ways and at different levels, it
can do analogical justice to the intricacies of self-enhancement.
LEVELS OF SELF-ENHANCEMENT
Wepropose that self-enhancement manifests itself at four levels:
as an observed effect, an ongoing process, a personality trait,
and an underlying motive. Consider now our gastronomic
analogy. One can have finished eating, as attested by the pres-
ence of an empty plate. One can be in the process of eating—the
activity by which that plate gets cleared of food. One can further
be chronically well-fed from dining heartily on a regular basis.
Finally, one can have an appetite for food—the desire that
sustains eating. In all four cases, the common thread is the in-
gestion of food. In the case of self-enhancement, the corre-
sponding common thread would be positive self-evaluation.
By way of illustration, consider the better-than-average effect
(BTAE)—the tendency for people to rate themselves higher than
others on desirable trait dimensions in contravention of statis-
tical logic (Alicke & Govorun, 2005). Such higher self-ratings,
as an observed effect, ostensibly qualify as an instance of self-
enhancement. Yet self-enhancement could also refer to the ego-
relevant mechanisms held to produce the BTAE: an ongoing
process. Furthermore, if one were to manifest the BTAE habit-
ually, then one would be displaying self-enhancement as a
personality trait. Finally, if one genuinely wished to see oneself
as superior, then this might be an underlying motive driving the
BTAE.
This four-way conceptual partition is relevant for several
reasons. First, self-enhancement, considered as either an ob-
served effect or personality trait, need not entail self-enhance-
ment as an ongoing process or underlyingmotive. In other words,
a particular expression or manifestation of positive self-evalu-
ation can admit of several alternative explanations, including
nonmotivational ones. (In comparison, gluttony and hunger are
not the only reasons people consume high-fat food or put on
weight—food availability and physical inactivity also play a
role.) Hence, care should be taken to not immediately identify
phenomena of interest with their putative causes. Second, and
conversely, self-enhancement can occur as a ongoing process or
underlying motive without necessarily manifesting itself as an
observed effect or personality trait. The motive to self-enhance,
and the psychological activities it prompts, will sometimes fail to
prompt positive self-evaluation. (In comparison, hunger does not
always result in eating, as food may be unavailable, nor does
eating always cause weight gain, such as in the case of hyper-
thyroidism.) Third—andmore generally—given the distinctions
between self-enhancement levels, one should take care not to
equivocate between them simply because an umbrella term
exists. Conceptual clarity is as crucial to the scientific enterprise
as methodological rigor (Machado & Silva, 2007).
As a case in point, consider the ongoing controversy over
whether self-enhancement is adaptive or maladaptive—that is,
whether self-enhancement helps or hinders the attainment of
well-being, success, health, and amity (Chang, 2007; Sedikides,
Gregg, & Hart, 2007). We cannot do this complex controversy
justice here. We merely note that much already hinges on how
self-enhancement is defined and operationalized. For example,
if self-enhancement is taken to mean rendering more positive
judgments of oneself than of others, then outcomes are fre-
quently favorable (Swann, Chang-Schneider, & McClarty, 2007;
Trzesniewski et al., 2006; but see Baumeister, Campbell,
Krueger, & Vohs, 2003), whereas if self-enhancement is taken to
mean rendering more positive judgments of oneself than others
render, then outcomes are often untoward (Colvin, Block, &
Funder, 1995; Paulhus, 1998; but see Bonanno, Rennicke,
Dekel, &Rosen, 2005). The debate is further complicated by the
fact that a single operationalization of self-enhancement can be
influenced by a variety of motives and, thus, can be coordinated
with both positive and negative outcomes (Gramzow, Elliot,
Asher, & McGregor, 2003). Some careful attempts have been
made to resolve these issues methodologically (Kwan, John,
Kenny, Bond, & Robins, 2004). However, for present purposes,
we note that much relevant research conceives of self-en-
hancement as an observed effect or as a personality trait
(Segerstrom & Roach, 2007). As such, it necessarily encounters
difficulties factoring out confounds with reality (e.g., does per-
sonally defined self-enhancement correlate with actual superi-
ority and/or does socially defined self-enhancement correlate
with actual inferiority?). If one instead conceives of self-en-
hancement as a psychological process driven by an underlying
motive, then a more disquieting picture emerges (Dunning,
Heath, & Suls, 2004; Klein & Cooper, 2007), as we discuss
below.
DIMENSIONS OF SELF-ENHANCEMENT
Self-enhancement can be further characterized as varying along
several bipolar dimensions. First, one can self-enhance either
by self-advancing or self-protecting—that is, either by aug-
menting the positivity or diminishing the negativity of the self-
concept or self-regard (Arkin, 1981). (The gastronomic analogy
would here be that one can eat to pleasure one’s palate or to stave
off starvation.) This classification is a subset of the more general
distinction between approach and avoidance (Elliot & Mapes,
2005). One empirical implication is that self-protection is a
more urgent priority than self-advancement, given that, in
general, ‘‘bad is stronger than good’’ (Baumeister, Bratslavsky,
Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). For example, the discrepancy be-
tween the self one currently is and the self one fears he or she
might become predicts emotional states better than the dis-
crepancy between the self one currently is and the self one would
ideally like, or feels morally obliged, to be (Heppen & Ogilvie,
2003). Individual differences also moderate which strategy
people adopt: Those with higher self-esteem prioritize self-ad-
vancement, whereas those with lower self-esteem prioritize self-
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protection (Tice, 1991), in keeping with their corresponding
tendencies towards risk-seeking or risk-aversion (Josephs,
Larrick, Steele, & Nisbett, 1992).
Second, one can self-enhance either publicly or privately. The
former involves an element of favorable self-presentation (Leary
& Kowalski, 1990), whereas the latter is a more purely intra-
psychic affair (Greenwald & Breckler, 1985). (The gastronomic
analogy here would be that one can eat either to satisfy hunger
pangs or out of social politeness.) The distinction is empirically
relevant because the presence of others sometimes potentiates
self-enhancement (Leary, Tchividjian, & Kraxberger, 1994) and
sometimes inhibits it (Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, & Elliot,
1998). And although self-enhancement unquestionably occurs
in private (J.D. Brown & Gallagher, 1992), social reality may be
introspectively introjected so that self-evaluation may always
implicitly take place in comparison with imagined others (Klein,
1997).
Third, people differ in terms of which domains matter most to
them (Crocker &Wolfe, 2001). Self-enhancement occurs mainly
in domains that do matter rather than in those that do not
(Crocker, 2002; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003). As
William James (1890/1950) put it, ‘‘I, who for the time have
staked my all on being a psychologist, am mortified if others
know much more psychology than I. But I am contented to
wallow in the grossest ignorance of Greek’’ (p. 310). (In com-
parison, people crave the foods they enjoy most.) Also relevant
here are the orthogonal constructs of agency and communion
(Paulhus & John, 1998), because individual differences in their
relative importance show distinctive correlates (Campbell,
Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002).
Finally, self-enhancement can be either candid or tactical
(Sedikides & Strube, 1997). That is, one can both seize an op-
portunity for overt and immediate self-advancement, or one can
forgo it in favor of other activities liable to facilitate delayed self-
enhancement. For example, one might tactically seek out di-
agnostic rather than flattering information about oneself (Trope,
1986) to remedy deficiencies or expand competencies
(Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Goldenberg, 2003), thereby en-
abling one to engage in more justified and enduring self-en-
hancement in the future. (In comparison, working up an appetite
increases subsequent enjoyment of food.) A reason to prefer
tactical over candid self-enhancement is that other people
generally dislike seeing the latter on display (Sedikides, Gregg,
& Hart, 2007). Indeed, narcissism can be characterized as in-
volving an impulsive preference for candid self-enhancement
(Vazire & Funder, 2006), possibly because of a more pressing
underlying motive to self-enhance (Sedikides & Gregg, 2001).
MANIFESTATIONS OF SELF-ENHANCEMENT
Putting aside the above distinctions for a moment, in what ways
do people self-enhance? The short answer is ‘‘many’’; the self-
enhancement ‘‘menu’’ contains an array of items, both classic
dishes and subtle side-orders.
Ostensible Effects
A triad of positive illusions has been identified (Taylor & Brown,
1988): People inflate their perceptions of themselves (e.g., the
BTAE), exaggerate their level of control over events, and are
overly optimistic about their future. Some examples of each
follow: First, university students in the U.S. and Europe regard
themselves as above-average drivers (Svenson, 1981), and even
drivers hospitalized after causing accidents persist in believing
they are no worse than regular drivers (Preston & Harris, 1965);
second, people perceive themselves to be in control of random
tasks (e.g., dice throws) that irrelevantly resemble skill-based
tasks (Langer, 1975) and see their actions to be influential even
when they are immaterial (Jenkins & Ward, 1965); and third,
people interpret probability adverbs to mean higher values for
personal positive outcomes and lower values for personal neg-
ative outcomes (Smits & Hoorens, 2005), whereas smokers un-
derestimate their risk of cancer relative to both nonsmokers and
fellow smokers (Weinstein, Marcus, & Moser, 2005). Moreover,
across many parameters, these positive illusions replicate reli-
ably and are resistant to revision (for inflation, see Alicke,
Vredenburg, Hiatt, & Govorun, 2001; for control, see Fenton-
O’Creevy, Nicholson, Soane, & Willman, 2003; for optimism,
see Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001). An ironic addendum is
that most people consider themselves to be less prone to such
illusions than others, even when explicitly told of their existence
(Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004).
A further signature of self-enhancement is the self-serving
attributional bias. People claim credit for successes but re-
nounce responsibility for failures: They attribute the former
internally to the self but attribute the latter externally to others
or to chance (Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004).
Kindred biases also exist for explanations for moral conduct
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990) and group behavior
(Pettigrew, 2001).
Alternative Explanations
Do such ostensible effects reflect a motivated process of self-
enhancement or something else? The question of whether cog-
nitive processes can account for seemingly motivational effects
is a perennial and vexatious one in social psychology (Kunda,
1990; Tetlock & Levi, 1982), and it reemerges here (Alicke &
Govorun 2005; Chambers & Windschitl, 2004).
To begin with, people regard themselves as above average on
easy tasks like riding a bicycle but below average on difficult
tasks like riding a unicycle (Kruger, 1999). This suggests that,
when sizing themselves up against others, people egocentrically
focus on how difficult or easy they would find a task and then
tendentiously extrapolate to the comparison they make, but not
necessarily in a self-enhancing way. In keeping with this in-
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terpretation, people’s ratings of themselves relative to others
correlate better with their ratings of themselves than of others
(Epley &Dunning, 2006). In addition, whenever any individual,
not merely the self, is compared with a (nonnegative) collective,
he or she comes off relatively favorably (Klar & Giladi, 1997).
Unsurprisingly then, when the comparison target is individua-
ted, the BTAE effect dwindles (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher,
Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995).
Similar deflationary findings emerge for overoptimism. Here,
event commonness is a key moderator: People consider fre-
quently occurring positive events, like living past the age of 70,
as being comparatively more likely to happen to themselves but
consider rarely occurring positive events, like living past the age
of 100, as comparatively more likely to happen to others
(Chambers, Windschitl, & Suls, 2003). Egocentrism again
seems like a viable explanation: For example, manipulations
that shift attention from the self to the comparative target curtail
overoptimism (Eiser, Pahl, & Prins, 2001). One even wonders
whether the more potent overoptimism effects observed for
controllable events (Harris, 1996) and the greater self-inflation
observed for controllable traits (Alicke, 1985)—both of which
seemingly reflect a self-enhancing synergy between two positive
illusions—might simply be due to controllable events and traits
being more commonplace (Moore, 2007). As for the self-serving
attributional bias, this might derive from legitimate expectations
of success combined with misperception or misconstrual of
contingencies (Miller & Ross, 1975).
Nonetheless, although cognitive factors contribute, often
substantially, to positive illusions, they do not wholly explain
them. For example, self-inflation persists even in comparison
with concrete others (Alicke et al., 1995), and event positivity
explains variance in overoptimism above and beyond event
commonness (Chambers et al., 2003). In addition, idiosyncratic
domain and trait importance respectively moderate both the
self-serving attributional bias (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999)
and the above-average effect (Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea,
2007b), a pattern unlikely to be wholly explained by other
confounds.
Subtler Signs
Self-enhancement manifests itself in less obvious ways too. In
such cases, unconscious psychological processes are automat-
ically recruited as a means of protecting and advancing self-
regard. In other words, self-enhancement occurs more as an
ongoing process than as an observed effect—in gastronomic
terms, more like the act of eating itself than the (variously ex-
plainable) presence of an empty plate.
For example, several studies find evidence of egotistical
distortions not only in the forecasting of future events, but also in
the remembrance of things past. People preferentially forget
negative feedback about themselves (Sanitioso & Wlodarski,
2004), specifically in domains that matter to them (Sedikides &
Green, 2000), even when that feedback is hypothetical (Green&
Sedikides, 2004; Sedikides & Green, 2004). In addition, people
preferentially and more quickly recall behaviors exemplifying
traits deemed diagnostic of success (Sanitioso, Kunda, & Fong,
1990), and they report such traits as being subjectively easier to
recall (Sanitioso & Niedenthal, 2006). People also remember
performing more desirable concrete acts during a group dis-
cussion task than objective coders can later identify (Gosling,
John, Craik, & Robins, 1998). They also recall higher test scores
than they actually received, with this self-enhancing memory
bias increasing as the test becomes more temporally distant
(Willard & Gramzow, in press). Furthermore, judgments related
to memory (e.g., hindsight biases) show self-serving distortions.
Past failures are perceived as having been more inevitable and
unforeseeable to the extent that one was invested in the possi-
bility of success (Blank & Nestler, 2006). Such memory biases
vary positively with level of self-esteem (Tafarodi, Marshall, &
Milne, 2003).
Moreover, the somewhat elastic content of the self-concept
gets stretched in a complimentary direction. For example,
people define virtues in terms of the traits they possess and
define vices in terms of the traits they lack (Dunning, Perie, &
Story, 1991), especially when their self-esteem is high (Beau-
regard & Dunning, 2001). These definitions then prompt either
more judgmental or generous evaluation of others, whichever
casts the self in a better light (Alicke, LoSchiavo, Zerbst, &
Zhang, 1997). Indeed, people not only self-servingly compare
themselves with others, but they also compare themselves with
how they used to be: They construe their current and future
selves as better than their past selves (Wilson &Ross, 2001) and
psychologically distance themselves more from previous nega-
tive episodes than from positive episodes (M. Ross & Wilson,
2002).
DYNAMICS OF SELF-ENHANCEMENT
Consider again our gastronomic analogy. Suppose one wished
definitively to establish that eating had motivational roots.
Finding empty plates or observing people eat would provide
circumstantial evidence for such a motivation. But more deci-
sive evidence would come from starving or stuffing people and
then observing their food-seeking preferences and behavior.
Similarly, the dynamic operation of the self-enhancement mo-
tive is more clearly revealed by studies that challenge or affirm
people’s ego and then observe how they subsequently feel or act.
Behavioral Self-Handicapping
Although performing well matters to people, they sometimes act
in ways that paradoxically hinder performance (Jones&Berglas,
1978). They do this either to protect themselves against the
shame of performing poorly (by manufacturing a convenient
excuse: discounting) or to enhance themselves by succeeding
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despite adversity (and manufacturing grounds for conceit:
augmenting; Rhodewalt, Morf, Hazlett, & Fairfield, 1991). The
discounting form of behavioral self-handicapping is liable to
occur when one doubts one’s capacity to perform due to shaky
self-regard (Newman & Wadas, 1997) or disbelief in the possi-
bility of improvement (Ommundsen, 2001). High neuroticism
and low conscientiousness also play a role (S.R. Ross, Canada,
& Rausch, 2002). Self-handicappers do manage to maintain
positive self-views (McCrea & Hirt, 2001) but only at the cost of
impairing objective performance (Zuckerman & Tsai, 2005). In
addition, self-handicapping maintains competence-related es-
teem, even at the risk of incurring social censure (Rhodewalt &
Tragakis, 2002). Underscoring the motivational character of
self-handicapping, people who bolster the self beforehand dis-
count less (Arndt, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002).
Behavioral self-handicapping is intriguing because it consti-
tutes an empirical demonstration of the perplexing phenomenon
of active self-deception (Giannetti, 2001).
Partisan Processing
Depending on whether people encounter congenial or uncon-
genial information (i.e., flattering or critical of their ego, im-
plying promising or ominous prospects), they apply more lenient
or stringent criteria while evaluating it and become corre-
spondingly more likely to accept or reject it. Of congenial in-
formation, people ask ‘‘Can I believe it?’’, but of uncongenial
information, they ask ‘‘Must I believe it?’’ (Dawson, Gilovich, &
Regan, 2007). For example, people consider personality feed-
back to be less accurate (Ditto & Boardman, 1995) and consider
scientific research to be less credible (Kunda, 1987) if it implies
they are susceptible to disease. In addition, they also think
harder about any inauspicious test results that they receive and
will spend longer considering them, are more inclined to check
them, and are more skeptical of them (Ditto & Lopez, 1992);
however, they do not react the same way to similar test results
received by others (Ditto, Munro, Apanovitch, Scepansky,
Lockhart, 2003). In addition, when research impugns the rep-
utation of groups with which people identify, they pick out sta-
tistical weaknesses of that research (Doosje, Spears, & Koomen,
1995). Such dynamics may partly underlie classic biased as-
similation effects (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979), although biased
scanning (Greenwald, 1969) and wishful perception (Balcetis &
Dunning, 2006) may also play a role.
Social Comparison Processes
The dynamics of self-enhancement extend into interpersonal
life, in which involuntary social comparisons prompt self-regula-
tory strategies. According to self-evaluation maintenance (SEM)
theory (Tesser, 1988), three factors are critical: one’s perfor-
mance in a domain, the personal relevance of that domain, and
one’s relationship to a target. First, when targets are close rather
than distant, comparisons are more likely and are of greater
consequence when they occur. Second, when a domain is rele-
vant, comparison (or contrast) occurs, a better performance
from another individual prompts self-derogation (e.g., humilia-
tion), whereas a worse performance from another individual
prompts self-enhancement (e.g., triumph). Third, when a domain
is irrelevant, reflection (or assimilation) occurs, a worse per-
formance from another individual prompts self-enhancement
(e.g., vicarious pride), whereas a better performance from an-
other individual prompts self-derogation (e.g., guilty shame).
Indeed, people have less favorable perceptions of targets’
performance in ego-relevant domains when those targets are
close rather than distant (Tesser & Campbell, 1982). The aver-
sive nature of these perceptions is attested to by the higher levels
of accompanying physiological arousal (Achee, Tesser, & Pi-
lkington, 1994). To escape or forestall such negative feelings,
people resort to several strategies including adjusting their
perceptions of task relevance (Tesser & Paulhus, 1983);
choosing friends who, despite being roughly matched in level
and type of ability, are somewhat less able in ego-relevant do-
mains and are somewhat more able in ego-irrelevant domains
(Tesser, Campbell, & Smith, 1984); and acting so as to hinder
close others’ performance in ego-relevant domains (Pemberton
& Sedikides, 2001). Comparable effects are observed in married
couples, with partners striving to complement rather than mimic
each other’s strengths (Beach, Whitaker, Jones, & Tesser, 2001).
However, matters are further complicated by the fact that part-
ners empathize with and wish to accommodate each other’s re-
flection and comparison processes (Pilkington, Tesser, &
Stephens, 1991)—a greater responsiveness to a partner’s SEM
needs than to one’s own predicts positive social interactions
(Mendolia, Beach, & Tesser, 1996).
SEM theory focuses on the consequences of involuntary social
comparisons, but people also have some latitude in terms of
which target they compare with and in how they construe that
target. In particular, although people generally compare them-
selves with similar or slightly superior others (Gruder, 1971),
there are occasions on which they are disposed to compare
themselves with inferior others (Wills, 1981)—for example, to
boost their sense of optimism and control by contrast with less-
fortunate individuals (Wood, Taylor, & Lictman, 1985). How-
ever, assimilation as well as contrast effects can occur (Muss-
weiler, 2003), meaning that downward comparisons can be
dispiriting (Wheeler & Miyake, 1992) and that upward com-
parisons inspiring (Collins, 2000). Indeed, if a target’s skill or
success are regarded as attainable (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997),
upward comparisons facilitate self-enhancement via expecta-
tions for self-improvement. However, attempting to defend
against an ego threat can bring out prejudices that would oth-
erwise remain dormant. For example, a threat to intelligence or
personal insult induce more stereotypical and less favorable
attitudes towards gays, Blacks, and women (Fein & Spencer,
1997; Sinclair & Kunda, 1999, 2000) and lead to the automatic
activation of such stereotypes and attitudes (Spencer, Fein,
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Wolfe, Fong, & Dunn, 1998). However, such ungenerous cons-
truals of social targets can be undone by the manipulations
discussed in the following section (Fein & Spencer, 1997).
Affirmations of Self
Although the dynamics of self-enhancement discussed so far in
principle encompass both self-protection and self-advance-
ment, the emphasis has squarely been on dealing with ego
threat. In contrast, self-affirmation (SA) theory focuses on ways
of preemptively propping up the ego, with a view to lessening
subsequent defensiveness (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). (In terms
of our gastronomic analogy—instead of depriving people of food
to explore the perturbing impact of hunger, one instead fills
people’s bellies, to explore the protective impact of satiety.) The
canonical manipulation involves having participants first report
and then elaborate on a value or domain that they personally
regard as important. Such a manipulation then reduces or
eliminates a range of typical self-protective responses, which
are itemized below. This effect suggests that a common psychic
currency underlies various self-enhancement dynamics (Tesser,
2000). SA theory labels this underlying currency as self-integ-
rity and defines it as ‘‘moral and adaptive adequacy.’’ Still, given
that it is claimed to involve at least two positive illusions (self-
positivity and perceived control), it can be equated, for our
purposes, with something like positive self-regard.
SA effects were first empirically demonstrated in relation to
cognitive dissonance phenomena (Harmon-Jones & Mills,
1999). SA undermined their emergence (Steele & Liu, 1983)
and thereby indirectly implicating the ego in their genesis
(Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992). For example, science students
who wore an identity-reinforcing lab coat no longer rationalized
a difficult choice between two closely matched alternatives by
augmenting their relative preference for the alternative they
chose (Steele, Hopp, & Gonzales, 1986; cited in Steele, 1988).
SA lessens bias. For example, it decreases the tendency for
students to exaggerate their current academic performance
(Gramzow & Willard, 2006). It also alleviates the partisan pro-
cessing of ambiguous messages in the direction of preexisting
opinions and eliminates preferences for those who share one’s
views (Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000). Moreover, by reducing
ideological entrenchment, it facilitates the making of conces-
sion crucial to the success of politically charged negotiations
(Cohen et al., 2007). Such effects are mediated by increased
attention to the central merits of arguments that opponents might
advocate (Correll, Spencer, & Zanna, 2004). In addition, al-
though close relationships are sometimes characterized by
competitive dynamics described by SEM theory, they also
generally serve as a potent SA resource—one that opens people
up to receiving critical information (Kumashiro & Sedikides,
2005) and restores positive illusions (Martz et al., 1998).
Furthermore, SA makes people less reluctant to take on board
potentially disquieting data about their health (Sherman, Nel-
son, & Steele, 2000), undoing standard biases (Reed & Aspin-
wall, 1998). Moreover, SA seemingly provides not only a
sustained impetus to health-promoting attitudes and actions
(Harris & Napper, 2005) but also concrete health benefits, in
terms of both coping with stress and reducing symptoms (Cre-
swell, Lam, et al., 2007; Creswell, Welch, et al., 2005). Finally,
SA has positive implications for social comparisons and be-
havior. It wards off SEM concerns, making people less likely to
sabotage the performance of close others in ego-relevant do-
mains; people spontaneously use SA to cope with SEM threats
(Tesser, Crepaz, Collins, Cornell, & Beach, 2000). SA also acts
as a prophylactic against derogatory social comparison. For
example, participants led to believe that their intelligence was
below average were normally prompted to bolster their egos by
choosing to listen to an incompetent interviewee as opposed to
competent one; however, an intervening SA manipulation sym-
metrically reverses this effect (Spencer, Fein, & Lomore, 2001).
The above might be taken to imply that SA invariably yields
edifying outcomes, which is not true. First, if the affirmation is in
the same domain as the outcome rather than another, SA
backfires (Stone & Cooper, 2003). Second, if people affirm their
rectitude or objectivity, then they become subsequently more
likely to take ethical liberties (B.R. Brown, 2000) or engage in
gender discrimination (Uhlmann, 2007). Third, if an ostensible
self-enhancement effect is driven by an amotivated process
(e.g., a cognitive bias in memory), SA has little impact on the
magnitude of the bias (Gramzow & Willard, 2006).
PRIMACY OF SELF-ENHANCEMENT
We have seen that self-enhancement emerges in a variety of
guises, often exerting potent effects. The question frequently
arises of just how primary self-enhancement is. Does it enjoy
pride of place relative to other psychological effects, activities,
traits, ormotives? Unfortunately, questions of global primacy are
notoriously difficult to settle (Ortony & Turner, 1990), and initial
assertions often require subsequent gentle qualification in the
light of evidence and criticism (Solomon, Greenberg, &
Pyszczynski, 1997). Hence, instead of taking a position on this
controversial issue, we identity two areas of relevant research,
summarize key findings, and leave readers to draw their own
conclusions.
By way of orientation, suppose one were to enquire into the
primacy of eating in human behavior. What issues might be
relevant? First, one could explore whether and to what extent
people’s eating was unconditional versus contingent. Would
other factors (e.g., setting, appetite) moderate its expression, or
would other imperatives (e.g., drinking, staying slim) eclipse it?
Second, one could explore whether and to what extent eating is
universal or culture specific. Would eating, or specific dining
practices (e.g., fast food, gourmet dining), characterize all cul-
tures or only some? Below, we explore two analogous issues with
regard to self-enhancement.
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Constraints on Self-Enhancement
According to Demosthenes (384–322 BCE), the Greek orator of
antiquity, ‘‘Nothing is so easy as to deceive oneself; for what we
wish, we readily believe.’’ But this is plain wrong—blatant self-
deception is very difficult. That is, people cannot self-enhance
willy-nilly; they must have sufficient grounds in their own eyes
for doing so. Unfortunately, such grounds are not automatically
forthcoming. To be reasonable, as opposed to delusional, is to
acknowledge that there are limits to what one can believe about
oneself and that reality informs us as to what these limits are.
Consequently, reason is not, as Hume (1738/1951) famously
put, ‘‘only the slave of the passions’’ (p. 415), but it is also
sometimes their master—albeit only partially and perhaps re-
luctantly.
Several lines of evidence bear out the view that self-en-
hancement occurs within the constraints imposed by rationality
and reality. For example, when extraverts and introverts are led
to believe that either extraversion or introversion predicts suc-
cess, they duly rate themselves higher than they otherwise would
on adjectives associated with the successful trait; but still, their
ratings remain more shaped by their preexisting personalities
than by the manipulated desirability of the traits (Sanitioso
et al., 1990). In addition, the BTAE occurs on ambiguously
defined traits (e.g., idealistic) rather than well-defined traits
(e.g., punctual)—even when the ambiguity involved is created or
eliminated experimentally (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg,
1989). Furthermore, ambiguous (rather than well-defined)
comparison targets facilitate self-enhancing social comparisons
(Stapel & Schwinghammer, 2004). In sum, positive self-evalu-
ations reflect not only what people want to believe, but also what
they can believe. (Gastronomically speaking, one can only in-
dulge one’s appetite to the extent one can afford to.)
Other findings illustrate indirectly how self-enhancement is
bounded by cognitive constraints. People evaluate their own
work less positively if they know that they will subsequently
have to defend and justify their evaluation before an audience.
Being held accountable in this way (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999)
leads people to anticipate being assessed as identifiable indi-
viduals (Sedikides, Herbst, Hardin, & Dardis, 2002), which in
turn prompts them to consider areas of possible weakness
(Sedikides & Herbst, 2002). Similar manipulations attenuate
the above-average effect in domains such as driving ability
(McKenna & Myers, 1997). Accountability may also explain
self-effacement among (relatively knowledgeable) friends than
among (more ignorant) strangers (Tice, Butler, Muraven, &
Stillwell, 1995). Self-evaluations also become less positive, and
self-concepts become less certain, when people generate and
concretize possible reasons for why they might or might not
possess particular personality traits, an activity we dub ex-
planatory introspection (Sedikides, Horton, & Gregg, 2007). In
both cases, the mechanism curtailing self-enhancement in-
volves drawing people’s attention to demerits they are usually
content to overlook.
Cognitive constraints are apparent in another way: When
reason is impaired, either by situational or dispositional factors,
self-enhancement is let loose. When people are put under
cognitive load or are distracted by affect-laden stimuli, they
become faster at endorsing and slower at denying positive traits
relative to negative traits, and they also endorse more of the
former than the latter (Paulhus, Graf, &Van Selst, 1989; Paulhus
& Levitt, 1987). In addition, people of lower ability in various
domains, who lack the metacognitive capacity to appraise
themselves validly, estimate their abilities to be considerably in
excess of what they are (Kruger & Dunning, 1999).
Yet, when time to think is available, the self-assessment
motive (Trope, 1986) often prevails. The key claim here is that
the pursuit of accurate information about the self matters in itself
whether or not this information is positive or negative, because
having an accurate self-view affords a sense of uncertainty re-
duction. Indeed, people prefer tasks that provide the most di-
agnostic information about their abilities in domains of which
they are most uncertain (Trope, 1979), regardless of whether
tasks diagnose success or failure (Trope, 1980). They also ex-
pend more effort and persist longer completing such diagnostic
tasks (Trope, 1982; Trope & Ben-Yair, 1982). Admittedly, such
impartial curiosity is not always observed: On a neutral self-
reflective task, for example, people choose to ask themselves
more diagnostic questions about positive rather than negative
traits in important domains and about traits they hold in high
rather than low certainty (Sedikides, 1993).
Nonetheless, the truth about oneself clearly matters. So does
this undermine the primacy of the self-enhancement motive?
Not necessarily. Consider our gastronomic analogy again. First,
the fact that people pragmatically restrict their eating within the
constraints imposed by food availability does not demote hunger
to the status of a secondary drive. Second, people sometimes
voluntarily restrict their eating to work up a better appetite for
later. That is, self-assessment, by subserving subsequent self-
improvement, can tactically facilitate eventual self-enhance-
ment (Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). Thus, self-assessment may not
reflect an interest in self-knowledge for its own sake, but rather a
form of prudent and adaptive self-control (Tangney, Baumeister,
& Boone, 2004) in which immediate ego gratification is dis-
counted relative to delayed ego gratification (Metcalfe &
Mischel, 1999).
What factors moderate whether people will self-assess versus
self-enhance?We have already seen how SA increases openness
to critical or inauspicious information (Sherman & Cohen,
2006). Positive mood exerts similar effects (Raghunathan &
Trope, 2002). It increases interest in negative or liability-fo-
cused feedback, and people spontaneously prepare for such
feedback by reviewing past successes (Trope & Pomerantz,
1998). Is self-enhancement therefore reducible to mood regu-
lation (Tesser, 2000)? There are two reasons not to think so.
First, self-enhancement has an intentional object (Searle,
1983)—it is about the self, whereas mood is not about anything
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in particular. Second, mood does not mediate SA effects (Sher-
man & Cohen, 2006). Nonetheless, positive mood certainly does
have an energizing and restorative effect (Tice, Baumeister,
Shmueli, & Muraven, 2007) and may account for many of the
functional benefits of self-enhancement (Roese & Olson, 2007).
Another factor moderating whether people self-assess or self-
enhance is the perceived modifiability of the ability under
consideration. In particular, when a trait is seen as modifiable,
people are less affectively disturbed by critical feedback and are
more interested in receiving it as well (Dauenheimer, Stahlberg,
Spreeman, & Sedikides, 2002; Green, Pinter, & Sedikides,
2005). They are also more likely to make internal attributions of
failure (Duval & Silvia, 2002). In general, when something can
still be changed, self-assessing realism tends to predominate,
whereas when something is a fait accompli, self-enhancing ra-
tionalizations take over (Roese & Olson, 2007).
Finally, alongside self-enhancement and self-assessment
(and its close cousin, self-improvement), a further self-motive
has been postulated: self-verification (Swann, Rentrow, & Gu-
inn, 2003) The key claim here is that identity matters in itself
whether or not it is positive or realistic, because having a co-
herent self-view affords a satisfying sense of prediction and
control in the interpersonal sphere. Moreover, some behavioral
evidence provocatively suggests that people are keener to self-
verify rather than self-enhance. For example, when given the
choice, people with negative self-views (e.g., depressives) opt to
interact with people who view them negatively as opposed to
positively and opt to read feedback that portrays them negatively
as opposed to positively (Giesler, Josephs, & Swann, 1996).
Such dynamics are counterintuitive and are worthy of empirical
attention as they are liable to stabilize often needlessly negative
self-views. However, it remains a moot point whether such
choices reflect the operation of a corresponding motive. An al-
ternative interpretation is that people with negative self-views
seek negative feedback, not because they want it to reinforce
their strangely cherished negative identity, but because they do
not regard themselves as rationally entitled to believe positive
feedback, even though they would dearly like to (Gregg, in
press).
Universality of Self-Enhancement
Culture is another apparently potent moderator of self-en-
hancement. It has been claimed that Easterners (e.g., Chinese,
Japanese) self-enhance less overall than Westerners (e.g.,
Americans, Europeans) and that—in some senses and ways—
they do not self-enhance at all (Heine & Hamamura, 2007;
Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). This alleged
difference in mental make-up is one of many attributed to the
divergent cultural traditions characterizing the West and East
(Heine et al., 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). The issue has
evoked considerable controversy (J.D. Brown & Kobayashi,
2002; Heine, 2003, 2005; Sedikides et al., 2003). Philosophi-
cally speaking, the issue recalls the perennial debate between
relativism and constructivism on the one hand and objectivism
and realism on the other (Rorty, 1979; Searle, 1997). Is self-
enhancement merely a contingent human practice that emerges
only occasionally, or is it a necessary human attribute that is
permanently present? We believe that the answer to the ques-
tion, and the correct interpretation of findings to date, turns
crucially on the level of self-enhancement one has in mind.
At the level of observed effects or personality traits, there is
indeed some evidence that Easterners self-enhance less than
Westerners. For example, Easterners spontaneously describe
themselves in more negative terms than Westerners (Kanagawa,
Cross, & Markus, 2001), make self-deprecatory social compar-
isons (Takata, 1987), and show a reduced or reversed self-
serving attributional bias (Hamamura & Heine, 2007). That
said, it has nonetheless been meta-analytically documented
that, in domains which Easterners and Westerners each regard
as idiosyncratically or normatively important, an above-average
bias emerges for everyone (Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea, 2005,
2007a, 2007b). This result squares with the view that, although
the domain of self-enhancement might vary across culture, the
phenomenon of self-enhancement is itself invariant (Sedikides
et al., 2003).
However, let us play devil’s advocate and imagine that East-
erners never self-enhanced at the level of an effect or a trait.
Arguably, such a state of affairs would still not undermine the
claim that the self-enhancement operated universally at the
level of a process or a motive. The reason is that, as stated above,
self-enhancement can be tactical as well as candid (Sedikides &
Strube, 1997). Hence, consistent null effects might simply re-
flect consistently tactical self-enhancement. Of course, East-
erners do candidly self-enhance in important domains by overtly
self-inflating (Sedikides et al., 2007a, 2007b). In addition, the
same defensive dynamics in response to ego threat occur in the
East as in the West (Heine, Niiya, & Harihara, 2002), although
further decisive research along these lines is needed. None-
theless, the overall character of oriental and occidental self-
enhancement may differ—a point on which partisans on both
sides of the issue seem to concur.When taking into account such
etic phenomena as the imperative to maintain face in Eastern
cultures (Hamamura & Heine, 2007) and recalling the four key
dimensions of self-enhancement outlined earlier, we would
postulate that, relative to Westerners, Easterners self-enhance
not only more tactically than candidly (but always candidly in
domains of importance), but that they do so by self-protecting
more than by self-advancing (Hamamura & Heine, 2007) and
more in private than in public (Crittenden, 1991).
Once again, the gastronomic analogy comes to our aid in
clarifying matters. Cross-cultural differences in eating habits
are evident. Perhaps conveniently for our analogy, the stereo-
typical Westerner consumes generous portions of burgers,
whereas the stereotypical Easterner consumes more modest
portions of sushi. However, the underlying motive—hunger—
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remains universal, even as its expression varies. To continue the
analogy, one would still expect both Easterners and Westerners
to greedily devour their favorite foods. In addition, we would
expect Westerners, relative to Easterners, to prioritize palate-
pleasuring in public.
Do any other findings suggest that self-enhancement is a true
human universal phenomenon rather than a culturally specific
phenomenon? Indeed, there are several that do so. First, al-
though the degree of overt self-enhancement may differ between
cultures, trait self-enhancement (e.g., self-esteem) nonetheless
shows the same pattern of correlations with other personality
traits across all cultures (Schmitt & Allik, 2005). Moreover,
average levels of self-esteem invariably lie above theoretical
scale midpoint. Second, genes account for substantial variance
in levels of self-esteem (Neiss, Sedikides, & Stevenson, 2006).
This suggests that cultural variations, at least in those envi-
ronments so far studied, do not wholly explain trait self-en-
hancement. Third, implicit self-esteem, reflected in the
automatic and involuntary positive evaluation of stimuli that
denote or connote the self (e.g., one’s name, personal pronouns),
characterizes Easterners and Westerners equally (Yamaguchi et
al., 2007). This implies that, at a primitive level of mental op-
eration beyond the reach of social desirability, the pleasant
scent of self consistently perfumes nearby objects. Fourth,
several specific sites in the brain have been identified as sub-
serving self-enhancement dynamics (Heatherton, Krendl,
Macrae, & Kelley, 2007). Thus, the ego seems to have a loca-
table physical substratum. Fifth, the link between self-
enhancement and health has been observed not only in the West
(Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003) but also in
the East (Gaertner, Sedikides, & Chang, in press). Finally,
researchers have constructed several plausible models, some
evidentially supported, implicating self-enhancement, in one
way or another, as a useful evolutionary adaptation. These
include self-enhancement as an energizing principle (Sedikides
& Skowronski, 2000), as an index of social value (Leary &
Baumeister, 2000), or as a defense against mortality
(Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). For all these
reasons, self-enhancement can be considered a cornerstone of
human psychology.
EPILOGUE
La Rochefoucauld (1678/1827) noted that ‘‘Whatever discov-
eries have been made in the land of self-love, many territories
remain to be discovered.’’ Thanks to the recent growth of em-
pirical psychology, the terra incognita of the ego is beginning to
be mapped by an array of specialized cartographers. Nonethe-
less, La Rochefoucauld’s remark remains as apt today as it was
in the 17th century. We hope (at the risk of mixing metaphors!)
that our review of the phenomenon of self-enhancement will
have both satisfied our readers’ appetite for current scientific
wisdom and given them food for further thought.
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